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In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of informa-
tion about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking
thanfemales,anditsimplicationsforratesofpromotionandabilitiesofsurvivors.
I deﬁne promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means
that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hier-
archies, the surviving risk takers have lower average ability whenever they have
a higher survival rate. Further, even if more risk takers than non risk takers are
promoted in the beginning of the hierarchy, that will be reversed over time. The
risk takers will eventually have a lower survival rate, but higher ability. As a conse-
quence of these differences, the various requirements of employment law cannot
simultaneously be satisﬁed. Further, if promotion standards are chosen to max-
imize proﬁt, the standards will reﬂect gender in ways that are difﬁcult to distin-
guish from discriminatory intent.
Keywords. Labor market hierarchy, promotion, discrimination, afﬁrmative ac-
tion, hierarchy, risk taking, gender bias.
JEL classification. J7.
1. Introduction
In this paper, I study the effect of risk taking on promotion in hierarchies, where pro-
motion at each stage depends on a signal of ability. The motivation comes from a sub-
stantial body of evidence that males are more risk taking than females, and from the
continuing controversy about why males and females have different patterns of success
in labor markets. Granting the premise that the genders differ in risk taking, does this
have explanatory power for labor markets? The answer is mixed, partly because the
theorems below can be applied to labor markets in different ways.
The theorems proved below compare promotions drawn from two populations, one
of which generates accurate signals of ability and the other of which generates noisy
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signals of ability. The premise is that true abilities have the same distribution in both
populations, at least initially, but that agents in one population give a noisy signal to the
decision maker. This is a reduced-form hypothesis that might follow from preferences
and optimizing behavior, or might reﬂect behavior that is hard-wired. This distinction
does not matter for the theorems that I prove, although it matters for the interpretation.
I introduce two types of promotion hierarchies: those with memory and those with-
out memory. In a hierarchy without memory, promotion at stage t depends only on the
signalofabilitygeneratedatstaget. Withmemory, promotioncandependontheentire
history of signals. Hierarchies such as sports tournaments do not have memory, since
survival depends only on winning the current match. Hierarchies such as academic la-
bor markets have memory, although promotion would typically depend more heavily
on current performance than on past performance. To emphasize the distinction be-
tween hierarchies with memory and those without, I assume for the case of memory
that all past signals are used symmetrically. There is no extra weight given to recent
performance.
In Section 2, I describe a simple model of hierarchical labor markets. In Section 3,
I show how promotion standards interact with risk taking, and prove an impossibility
result related to employment law. Even with one period of promotion, it is impossible
to ﬁnd a promotion policy that simultaneously (a) promotes according to gender-blind
standards, (b) promotes at equal rates from the two populations, and (c) ensures that
the promoted pools have equal expected abilities. The various legal principles about
discrimination are in conﬂict.
In Section 4, I study hierarchies with and without memory, focussing on two impor-
tant statistical properties—survival rates and the expected abilities of survivors. With
gender-blind promotion standards, males may be advantaged at the beginning due to
their risk-taking behavior, but this will be reversed at the end. Further, any advantage in
the promotion rate coincides with a deﬁcit in ability. If males have a higher promotion
rate at the beginning, they have lower average ability than the promoted females, but
this will also be reversed at the end.
In Section 5, I turn to private objectives rather than social objectives. Different stan-
dards will be used in the two cases in which (a) promotion means changing employers
and (b) all promotions take place within a ﬁrm. If a ﬁrm keeps a worker for only a single
period, then the promotion standards that materialize equalize the marginal abilities of
promoted workers in the two populations. But if promotions are within a ﬁrm, the ﬁrm
has an incentive to preserve options on the employees with noisy signals, since more
information will be collected later. At early stages, the ﬁrm retains risk takers who have
lower expected ability than is required of the non risk takers. If the males are the risk
takers, males are favored.
Since the paper is motivated by the considerable evidence that males are more risk
taking than females,1 I refer to risk takers as males, and non risk takers as females.
1SeeEckelandGrossman(2002)ongamblingbehavior, BajtelsmitandBernasek(1996), Jianakoplosand
Bernasek (1998), and Charness and Gneezy (2007) on investment behavior, Slovic (1966), Mittal and Dhade
(2007),andGinsburgandMiller(1982)forexperimentswithchildren,andEspinosaandGardeazabal(2006)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 501
However, although the males’ risk taking may lead to noise in formal labor-market sig-
nals like exams, other social phenomena may cause females’ signals to be noisier than
those of males. Promotions often rely on informal evidence like letters of reference. If
males are observed more closely than females, then females may have noisier signals.
Informal evidence is often under the control of the observer rather than the candidate.
An academic in hope of promotion cannot commandeer attendance at a seminar, and
an employee cannot demonstrate competence without being given a task. If opportu-
nities to give informal evidence are more available to males than to females, then the
signals generated by males may be more accurate than those of females, and we must
reverse our understanding of the theorems in this paper.
2. Risk takers, non risk takers, and hierarchies
Suppose that agents’ abilities are given by a random variable A with distributionG and
density g, ﬁnite variance, and support equal to the real line. Males and females have the
same distribution of abilities. A male with ability A = a generates a sequence of inde-
pendent random signals Z1,Z2,...,Zt,... each with distribution ( j a), density (ja),
mean a, ﬁnite variance, and support equal to the real line.






when z1 >z2 and a1 >a2.
I sometimes use the following more speciﬁc assumption that the signalZ is ability plus
noise.
Assumption A. Conditional on A = a, for each t, the random variable Zt is equal to
a +Ut, whereU1,U2,...,Ut,... are distributed independently with bounded density u,
and (z ja) = u(z   a). The densities g and u are single peaked and symmetric
around 0, with ﬁnite variance and supports equal to the real line.
Promotionstandardsaregivenbyasequenceofrealnumbers,c =c1,c2,...,ct,... in-
terpretedasthresholdsforpromotion. Duetothemonotonelikelihoodratio,thethresh-
old policy selects agents who have higher ability in expectation.
Saythatthepromotionstandardsaregenderblind ifallagentsfacethesamepromo-
tion standards. When I do not assume gender-blind promotion standards, I refer to the
males’ promotion standards by m = m1,m2,...,mt,... and to the females’ promotion
standards by f = f1, f2,..., ft,...
Saythatthepromotionstandardsc arebounded ifthereexist
¯
c, ¯ c suchthat
¯
c ct  ¯ c
for all t.
on gender differences in exam strategies. See Eckel and Grossman (2008) for a comparison of the results
from ﬁeld studies versus contextual environmental experiments. See Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) for an
evolutionary argument for the gender difference.502 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
A female with ability a survives to stage t if a  cd for each d = 1,...,t. The proba-
bility of survivalSF




0 if a <cd for some d t
1 if a cd for each d t.





















To deﬁne the survival rate of males, I distinguish between promotion hierarchies
that have memory and those that do not. In a hierarchy without memory, promotion at
stage t, conditional on survival to t  1, depends only on the performance in period t.
In a hierarchy with memory, promotion at stage t, conditional on survival to t  1, de-
pends on the cumulative performance to t. I study the special case in which promotion
depends symmetrically on all the previous signals, through the mean.
2.1 Survival in hierarchies without memory
Say that a male survives to t in a hierarchy without memory if Zd  cd for d = 1,...,t.
































A marginal survivor at stage t is an agent who generates the signal Zt = ct. The
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2.2 Survival in hierarchies with memory
For the random sequence Z1,Z2,...,Zt,... deﬁne the sequence of sample means ¯ Z1,
¯ Z2,... ¯ Zt,... where ¯ Zt = (1=t)
Pt
k=1Zk for each t. Say that a male survives to t in a hier-
archy with memory if ¯ Zd cd, for d =1,...,t.
When A = a, denote the probability of survival to t by ¯ S
M















The survival rate of males at stage t (with memory) is E[¯ SM
t (A,c)]. The expected

















A marginal survivor at stage t is an agent who generates the signal ¯ Zt = ct. With
memory, the probability of being marginal at stage t depends not only on the stage-t
signal Zt, but on the accumulated success up to that point,
Pt 1
k=1Zk. Let ¯ g( j c,t) be
the probability density describing the distribution of ability, conditional on surviving to




































a ¯ g(a jc,t)da.
At each a, the probability of survival, ¯ SM
t (a,c), is decreasing with t, and bounded











I show in Lemma 3 that the support is [¯ c,1), where ¯ c =limsupct.
Because the survival function ¯ SM
t (,c) is increasing, the limit function ¯ SM(,c) is non-







Figure 1. First stage of the hierarchy
3. Antidiscrimination goals: an impossibility result
Beforeturningtohowpromotionplaysoutinahierarchy, Iuseasingleroundofpromo-
tion to show how differences in risk taking create a conﬂict among the following three
natural objectives of labor policy:
 gender-blind promotion standards
 equal survival rates
 equal abilities of survivors.
InFigure1,thedistributionofabilitiesA (hencethedistributionofsignalsgenerated
by females) is shown by the density g. For this purpose, suppose that Assumption A
holds. Then the distribution of the signal Z generated by males is a mean-preserving
spread of g. The marginal distribution ofZ is represented by the density ˜  in Figure 1.
Suppose the males’ promotion standard at stage 1 is m1. The resulting probability
of survival is the area to the right of m1. If the promotion standard is gender blind,
all females with signal (ability) above m1 are also promoted. However, there are fewer
females than males, provided m1 >0, since ˜  is a mean-preserving spread of g.
At the same time, females who exceed the standard m1 have higher average ability
than males. This follows from a very general result, stated in Lemma 1 below, that the
average ability of surviving males is lower than the average ability of surviving females
in any period where males have a higher survival rate. We thus see immediately—and it
is stated formally in Proposition 1—that gender-blind standards are incompatible with
equal promotion rates and with equal abilities. To equalize the survival rates, the female
promotion standard must be lower, namely, f n
1 in Figure 1, and to equalize abilities, the
female promotion standard must be lower still, namely f a
1 .
That the promotion standards are ordered as drawn is stated in Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 (If males have a higher survival rate than females, males have lower average
ability). Let (m, f ) be promotion standards for males and females. Suppose that theTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 505
survival rate of males is no smaller than the survival rate of females at time t:
E[SM
t (A,m)] E[SF
t (A, f )] (without memory)
E[¯ SM
t (A,m)] E[SF
t (A, f )] (with memory).
Then the expected ability of a random surviving male is smaller than the expected ability
of a random surviving female:
EM[A jm,t]< E F[A j f ,t] (without memory)
¯ EM[A jm,t]< E F[A j f ,t] (with memory).
The lemma is proved in the Appendix. It uses essentially no assumptions on the dis-
tributionsorpromotionstandards, andisthusverygeneral. Theintuitionissimplythat,
becausemalesgeneratenoisysignals,mistakesaremadeinpromotingthem. Somehigh
ability males are not promoted, and some low ability males are promoted. In contrast,
no mistakes are made in promoting females. Hence, if males and females are promoted
in equal numbers, the average ability of the surviving males must be lower.
Proposition 1 (The impossibility of equalizing survival rates, abilities and standards).
Let m be the promotion standards for males. Let f n (respectively f a) be promotion stan-
dards for females such that their survival rate (respectively, ability) equals that of surviv-
ing males at stage 1. Then
(i) f a
1 < f n
1
(ii) if Assumption A holds and m1 >0, then f n
1 <m1.
Proof. Part (i) follows because E[SF
1(A, f n)] = E[SM
1 (A,m)] < E[SF
1(A, f a)]. The ﬁrst
equality is by deﬁnition of f n and the second follows from Lemma 1. If E[SM
1 (A,m)] 
E[SF
1(A, f a)] then the expected ability of male survivors would be smaller than that of
females at stage 1, a contradiction.
(ii) Using Assumption A, the distribution of ability second-order dominates the dis-
tribution of the signal Z. Both have mean 0, so for m1 > 0, the probability that a male
survives (namely, the probability thatZ >m1) exceeds the probability that a female sur-
vives according to the same standard (the probability that A > m1). Hence, to increase
the probability that a female survives, and in particular to equalize the survival rates, we
must have f n
1 <m1. 
Proposition 1 illustrates why “afﬁrmative action” in labor markets is a vexed issue.
It is not possible at the same time to equalize numbers, equalize abilities, and also to
satisfy the procedural objective of having gender-blind standards.2
2Spitzer (1979) makes a similar argument, showing how courts and agencies must balance objectives
that can be mutually inconsistent. Most pertinently, he applies his analysis to the Bakke decision (Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)), in which the split decision of the Supreme Court is largely
due to the fact that different justices were concerned with different objectives, all legitimate, which cannot
simultaneously be satisﬁed.506 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
However, employment law seems to have all three objectives. Antidiscrimination
law in the U.S. dates mainly to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and its extension
in the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act.3 These Acts disallow disparate treat-
ment by employers based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion, with respect
to hiring, promotion, compensation, or termination decisions.4 At the same time, an
employer’s practices might run afoul of Title VII if they have a disparate impact on a
protected group.5
Whereasdisparatetreatmentconcernstheindividual, andinparticular, whetherthe
employer intended to discriminate against the individual, disparate impact is about the
effects of an employment practice on an entire group. The employer’s intent is not at
issue in disparate impact cases. A Title VII disparate-impact violation results when a
seemingly neutral employment practice affects opportunities in ways that are not race-
or gender-neutral, and where the employer cannot prove that the practice is justiﬁed
under Title VII’s business necessity defense.6
Proposition 1 points out that the bans on disparate treatment and disparate impact
are contradictory. Title VII insists on gender-blind employment practices, but gender-
blind employment practices lead to disparate impacts on the numbers promoted and
on survivors’ abilities. These disparate impacts cannot be remedied by gender-blind
promotion standards. Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the standards for females
must be lower than for males early in the hierarchy, but (as we will see) higher as the
hierarchy progresses.
Thecontradictionbetweengender-orrace-blindnessanddisparateimpactsurfaces
in personnel policies that seem incomprehensible.7 MIT’s Human Resources page8
poses the question “Is afﬁrmative action an employment quota system?” Since “quotas
3A great deal has been written on the legal details and their impact. On the economic side, see Rodgers
(2006). ThechapterHolzerandNeumark(2006)outlinesthebroadcontoursofthelaw. Forahistoryofhow
the law developed, see Blumrosen (1993), and for detail on the evidentiary conundrums that arise, see, for
example, Krieger (1995).
4The more pro-active notion of “afﬁrmative action” originates in Executive Orders 10925 (1961), 11246
(1965, 1967), and 11625 (1971) of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, respectively, aimed at
federal contractors.
5The ban on disparate impacts evolved from policies of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), which was created to enforce the Civil Rights Act. See Blumrosen (1993, 73–75), and Leiter
and Leiter (2002, 43–47). In the absence of clear deﬁnitions or a clear legislative intent behind the Civil
Rights Act, the EEOC pursued policies that imputed to the law an ambition to improve the economic cir-
cumstances of minorities. This led to policies against disparate impact that were enunciated as law by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6Krieger (1995) discusses why it is difﬁcult to prove discrimination under both theories. She argues that
disparatetreatmentmayresultfromsubtlestereotypesevenwherethereisnodiscriminatoryintent. Where
there are patterns and practices of discrimination, also known as systemic disparate treatment, she argues
that disparate impact theory is like a software “patch,” (p. 1227). Although disparate impact theory circum-
vents the intent requirement, it creates problems that make judges reluctant to apply it. Moreover, Krieger
argues that, in response to disparate impact theory, employers have shifted from quantiﬁable criteria like
test scores to subjective standards involving unquantiﬁable variables.
7That contradictions arise from competing values has been convincingly discussed in the case of race
by Edley (1996).
8http://web.mit.edu/hr/aa/what_is.htmlTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 507
are expressly forbidden by federal law,” the answer is that if “underutilization” of mi-
nority groupsis discovered, ...“placement goalsare established ...Goalsare targets, not
quotas.” The page does not explain the difference between targets and quotas, but as-
serts that there is no conﬂict between targets and “principles of merit.” Proposition 1
suggests otherwise.
4. The hierarchies
I now turn to what happens as the hierarchy continues after the ﬁrst stage. In partic-
ular, I assume there are inﬁnitely many periods of promotion. The inﬁnite sequence
is unrealistic, but reveals a pattern for late stages that might otherwise be obscure. In
particular, with gender-blind standards, there is a reversal in the relative numbers and
relative abilities of the surviving populations of males and females. At the beginning of
the hierarchy, under the reasonable conditions of Figure 1, gender-blind strategies lead
to a higher survival rate among males than among females, but lower ability. At the end,
this is reversed. I show that the reversal occurs in hierarchies with and without memory.
4.1 The hierarchy without memory
I ﬁrst discuss how the hierarchy without memory plays out. Proposition 2 says that, in a
hierarchy with gender blind standards, there is eventually a higher survival rate among
females, but they have lower ability. This is essentially because males have an opportu-
nity to throw themselves out of the pool at every stage, and will eventually do so, except
possibly those with very high ability.
Lemma 2 is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Only males with very high ability survive in the limit). Let m = m1, m2,...,
mt,... be bounded promotion standards for a hierarchy without memory.
(i) Given " > 0, there exists ˜ t such that for t > ˜ t, the survival rate (1) of males at stage
t is less than ".
(ii) Given2(0,1)and x >0,thereexists ˜ t suchthatfor t > ˜ t,theprobabilityissmaller
than  that a male survivor has ability less than x.
(iii) Given x > 0, there exists ˜ t such that for t > ˜ t, the expected ability (2) of a male
survivor is larger than x.
(iv) Given x > 0, there exists ˜ t such that for t > ˜ t, the expected ability (3) of a marginal
male survivor is larger than x.
Proposition 2 (Gender-blind promotions without memory). Let c = c1,c2,...,ct,... be
bounded, gender-blind promotion standards for a hierarchy without memory. Then there
exists ˜ t such that for t > ˜ t, the survival rate of males is smaller than the survival rate of
females, but the surviving males have higher expected ability.508 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
The proposition follows from Lemma 2. That males eventually survive with smaller
probability than females follows directly from Lemma 2(i), by choosing " > 0 such that
(1 G(ct))>" for all t. That male survivors eventually have higher expected ability than
surviving females follows by choosing x in Lemma 2(iii) to be larger than the (bounded)
expected ability of surviving females.
Now suppose that the survival rates are equal rather than that standards are gender
blind. Then Proposition 3 says that the males’ promotion standards cannot be bounded
below. This can be interpreted to mean that promotion standards become irrelevant; all
surviving males are eventually promoted.
Since the promotion standards for females are bounded, there will eventually be
a stationary, positive measure of surviving females. Hence, the population of surviv-
ing males must also become stationary with a positive measure of survivors. But if
the males’ promotion standards are bounded below, males still have an opportunity to
throwthemselvesoutofthepoolateverystage, andtheirnumberswilldecline. Toavoid
this,thepromotionstandardsmustbecomeverylowinordertokeepallthemalesinthe
pool. Males appear to be getting special treatment, but no males are proﬁting from the
special treatment because their performance is well above the very low standard.
Proposition 3 (Equal survival rates in a hierarchy without memory). Let (m, f ) be pro-
motion standards in a hierarchy without memory, such that males and females have the
same survival rates at each stage t. If the promotion standards f are bounded, then the
performance standards m are not bounded below.
Proof. Since f1, f2,..., ft,... converge to a ﬁnite number, the female survival rates
E[SF
t (A, f )], t = 1,2,..., converge to a positive number, say L > 0, and, by hypothesis,
the male survival rates E[SM
t (A,m)], t = 1,2,..., converge to the same limit, L. Sup-
















m ja))t da. (5)
Choose an " >0 such that " < L. Choose ˜ a, ^ a such that ^ a < ˜ a and
1 G( ˜ a)<"=3
G(^ a)<"=3.
Due to the monotone likelihood ratio property, (
¯
m ja) decreases with a. Choose ^ t
such that (1 (
¯
m j ˜ a))^ t < "=3. Then if t > ^ t, the upper bound on the male survival rate
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Figure 2. Survival in a Hierarchy with Memory
Proposition 4 (Equal ability in a hierarchy without memory). (i) Suppose, in a hierar-
chy without memory, that the expected abilities of surviving males and females are
equal at stage ^ t under the promotion standards (m, f ). Then the female survival
rate at stage ^ t is greater than the male survival rate.
(ii) In a hierarchy without memory, there are no bounded promotion standards (m, f )
for which surviving males have the same average ability as surviving females at
each stage t.
Proposition 4(i) follows directly from Lemma 1, which would otherwise be contra-
dicted. Proposition 4(ii) follows from Lemma 2(iii) by choosing x larger than the ex-
pected ability of female survivors at every t.
4.2 The hierarchy with memory
I now show that, if the hierarchy has memory, males survive in the limit with positive
probability. As the hierarchy progresses, it is increasingly difﬁcult to overturn a sur-
vivor’s accumulated success. Each new signal is blended into the average, and its effect
is therefore muted. Nevertheless, if the standards are gender blind, it is still true that
eventually a smaller proportion of males than females survives, and they have higher
average ability. This must be proved in a different manner than the analogous result
without memory (Proposition 2), since the analog to Lemma 2 does not hold.
Proposition 5 follows from the shape of the limiting survival function ¯ SM(,c), de-
scribed in Lemma 3 and shown in Figure 2. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 (The limit distribution in a hierarchy with memory). Suppose that the promo-
tion standards are c = c1,c2,...,ct,..., and limsupct = ¯ c. For each a  ¯ c, ¯ SM(a,c) = 0.
Given " >0, for each a > ¯ c +", ¯ SM(a,c)>0.
Proposition 5 uses the hypothesis that promotion standards are nondecreasing.
With decreasing promotion standards, all females with ability above c1 would survive,
and none would be eliminated after stage one. This is not true of males. If the perfor-
mance standards decrease rapidly, males with abilities lower than c1 might survive in510 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
large numbers, and the limiting expected ability of males could be lower than that of
females. In any case, increasing promotion standards are the more natural case.
Proposition 5 (Gender-blindpromotionswithmemory). Let c =c1,c2,...,ct,... benon-
decreasing, gender-blind promotion standards that converge to ¯ c in a hierarchy with
memory. Then there exists ^ t such that for t > ^ t, the survival rate of males is smaller
than that of females, but the surviving males have higher expected ability.
Proof. Using Lemma 3, for a < ¯ c, neither males nor females survive. For a > ¯ c, the
probability that a female survives is one, while for males, the survival probability is less
than one: ¯ SM(a,c) < 1 (c1 j a) < 1. Thus, the limit survival rate of males is smaller
than that of females.
Because the males’ limit probabilities of survival are nondecreasing with a, and
strictly increasing on some domain (since ¯ SM(a,c) > ¯ SM(¯ c,c) for some a > c), the limit
distributionoftheirabilitiesﬁrst-orderdominatesthelimitdistributionoffemales’abil-
ities. Thus, the expected ability of surviving males is greater than that of surviving fe-
males. 
Proposition 6 (Equal average ability with memory). Supposethehierarchyhasmemory,
and suppose that (m, f ) are promotion standards such that the expected abilities of a
random surviving male and a random surviving female are equal at stage t. Then the
survival rate of females at stage t is greater than that of males.
This result follows directly from Lemma 1.
5. Private objective functions
So far, the strategy of this paper has been to study the promotion standards that satisfy
some social objective, such as equal survival rates of males and females or gender-blind
standards, and to show the conﬂicts that are created. I now characterize the promotion
standards that arise without legal constraints. I do not start from the premise that em-
ployers dislike diversity, or that they are willing to sacriﬁce proﬁt in order to avoid it,
but rather from the premise that employers are proﬁt maximizers whose decisions may
nevertheless lead to disparate impacts. The objective is to see which of the social goals
are preserved, if any, and whether “discrimination” can be identiﬁed.9
The implicit assumption in what follows is that wages can be different at different
stages of the hierarchy, but wages cannot be different for males and females, and wages
do not depend directly on signals.
5.1 Promotions across ﬁrms
Suppose that, to be promoted, an agent must get a job with a different employer. An
employer hiring at t selects from the survivors to t  1. This creates externalities among
9The conceit in this paper is that promotion standards are set according to some well-conceived objec-
tive, either constrained by law, or guided by proﬁt, but not guided by reference to the pool that is already
promoted. For an interesting discussion of the latter, see Sobel (2001).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 511
ﬁrms, since the distribution of abilities in an employer’s pool is determined by previous
employers’ promotion decisions.
Because an employer retains its workers for a single period, its sole objective is to
take the workers with highest ability. For each t = 1,2,..., let Wt be the proﬁt objective


















The proﬁt function is an aggregate for all employers at stage t. The wage rate is wt, and
ability a is understood as the proﬁt of employing an agent with ability a. I assume that
the wages are bounded and nondecreasing, and converge to ¯ w. This implies that the
female promotion standards f are bounded and nondecreasing, and also converge.10
It is straightforward to show that the optimal standards equalize the expected abili-
ties of marginal survivors.
Lemma 4. If the promotion standards (m, f ) maximize total ability net of wages, (6a) (re-
spectively, (6b)), then the standards (mt, ft) equalize the abilities of marginal males and
marginal females at t. In particular, (7a) (respectively, (7b)) holds.
eM[A jm,t] wt = ft  wt =0 (7a)
¯ eM[A jm,t] wt = ft  wt =0. (7b)
Proposition7characterizesthestandardsthatariseendogenouslywhenpromotions
are across ﬁrms. Males are held to a higher standard at the earliest stage provided fewer
than half are promoted, but in the hierarchy without memory, males are eventually pro-
moted on weak performance, much weaker than required of females. This is for a rea-
son similar to when standards are chosen to equalize promotion rates (Proposition 3). If
the males’ promotion standards did not become low, males would keep throwing them-
selves out of the pool, and the expected ability of the marginal (and average) survivor
would keep rising. But if the objective is to stop them from getting thrown out of the
pool, and hence to equalize the abilities of marginal survivors, then the males’ standard
must become low. A male’s probability of generating such a low standard must go to
zero.
For the hierarchy with memory, I use Assumption B in order to avoid complicated
arguments based on rates of convergence.
Assumption B. In the limit of the hierarchy with memory, each male’s ability is known,
and the distribution of males’ abilities has the limit distribution (4).
10In (6a) and (6b), that is why I write the objective function for females with a minimum ability ft rather
than maxdtffdg.512 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Since the abilities of males are revealed in the limit, their standard for promotion is
ultimately the same as for females. There are marginal females in the limit, in the sense
that there remain a positive mass of females with abilities in a neighborhood of the limit
promotion standard, ¯ f . However, due to the selection process before reaching the limit,
there are no marginal males. Proposition 7(ii) and (iii) say that the probability of a risk
taker being marginal at late stages of the hierarchy converges to zero.
In the hierarchy with memory, the marginal probability density of the signal Zt at











Proposition 7 (Promotion standards that equalize the abilities of marginal survivors).
Suppose that at each stage t, the promotion standards (m, f ) maximize total ability net
of wages (6a) (respectively, (6b)), so that marginal male and female survivors have equal
expected abilities. Suppose Assumption A holds.
(i) Whether or not the hierarchy has memory, if m1 > 0, females face a lower promo-
tion standard than do males at stage 1. That is, m1 > f1.
(ii) Suppose the hierarchy does not have memory. Then males eventually face lower
promotion standards than females, but there are almost no marginal males. That
is, given " >0, there exists ˜ t such that for t > ˜ t, mt < ft and ˜ t(mt)<".
(iii) Suppose the hierarchy has memory, and that Assumption B holds. Then males
eventually face the same promotion standards as females, but there are almost no
marginal males. In particular, limsupmt = limsup ft. Given " > 0, there exists ˜ t




Proof. (i) It is enough to show that the expected ability of a marginal male is less than

























The inequality follows because the integral in (8) is positive. The denominator isTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 513

















y[g(m1  y)  g(m1 +y)]u(y)dy >0.
In the second line, u(y) = u( y) due to the symmetry of u and in the last line,
[g(m1   y)   g(m1 + y)] > 0 due to m1 > 0 and the symmetry and single-peakedness
of g.
(ii) To show that mt < ft, let
¯
f and ¯ f be the lower and upper bounds for f . Letx  ¯ f .
UsingLemma2(iv),ifm isbounded,thenforlarget,theexpectedabilityofthemarginal
male survivor is larger than x, hence larger than ft, a contradiction. Therefore m is not




I now show that ˜ t(mt) < " for t > ˜ t. Using Assumption A, an upper bound for
(mt ja)=u(mt  a) is u(0). Let ,>0 be such that u(0)+<".
Choose x > 0 and ˜ t large enough so that u(mt  a) < u( ¯ f  a) <  for a > x and,

























































(iii) The proﬁt Z 1
¯ m
(a   ¯ w)¯ SM(a,m)g(a)da
is maximized by choosing ¯ m = ¯ w, hence limsupmt should be ¯ m. Since limsup ft = ¯ f =




t (a,m)da <"514 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
for large t follows from Lemma 3 and Figure 2. 
Whenthepromotionstandardsequalizetheexpectedabilitiesofmarginalsurvivors,
both the survival rates and abilities of male and female survivors differ. These differ-
ences have an efﬁciency explanation, and in particular do not follow from gender pref-
erences on the part of employers.
However, disparate treatment due to a legitimate business objective is hard to dis-
tinguish from disparate treatment due to gender preferences.









t (A, f )]

.
If U is increasing, the objective explicitly favors males. But the standard for males may
still be higher at the beginning of the hierarchy than for females, and lower at the end,
whether the objective is W or W +U. Because of this ambiguity, courts and policymak-
ers may resort to procedural rules such as a requirement for gender-blind standards or
equal survival rates.
5.2 Promotions within the ﬁrm: preserving options
Suppose now that all promotions take place within a single ﬁrm. Then the ﬁrm itself
proﬁts from the information it collects through its promotion decisions. I show that the
ﬁrmhasanincentivetokeepamaleinthepoolatearlystages, despiteamoderatelybad
signal, inordertocollectmoreinformationandpreserveanoption. Inparticular, Ishow
that at an early stage the ﬁrm retains males with lower expected ability than is tolerated
in promoted females. In this sense, males are favored.
Consider a hierarchy with three stages (t = 0,1,2) and two promotions (at t = 1,2).
At stage 0, there is no employer, but agents generate signals of ability. These are used
for hiring in the ﬁrst promotion stage. A ﬁrm’s objective function is equal to the sum of
workers’ abilities in each promotion period, net of wages.















(a  w2)g(a)[1 (m1 ja)][1 (m2 ja)]da. (9)
In Proposition 8(i), I assume that wages in both periods are equal. This assumption
isolates the incentive to preserve options from the problem that the cost of a mistake is
compounded when wages are increasing.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 515
Proposition 8 (Preserving options within the ﬁrm). Supposetherearethreeperiodswith
two promotions that take place within a single ﬁrm. Suppose the promotion standards
(f1, f2), (m1,m2) maximize (9).
(i) Supposethat w1 =w2 =w. Thentheexpectedabilityofamarginalmaleattheﬁrst
promotion stage is smaller than the expected ability of a marginal female. That is,
eM[A jm,1]< f1.
(ii) The expected ability of a marginal male at the ﬁnal promotion stage is the same as
that of a marginal female. That is, eM[A jm,2]= f2.





(a  w1)g(a)(m1 ja)da +
Z 1
 1
(a  w2)g(a)(m1 ja)[1 (m2 ja)]da =0 (12)
Z 1
 1
(a  w2)g(a)[1 (m1 ja)](m2 ja)da =0. (13)








Write M2 for the probability of being a marginal male in the ﬁrst promotion and also

























The density in the ﬁrst integral of (14) describes the males who were marginal at the ﬁrst
promotion. The density in the second integral of (14) describes the males remaining
from that group after the second promotion. Because (m2 j +w) is decreasing with516 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
, the distribution in the second integral stochastically dominates the distribution in
the ﬁrst integral. Because of stochastic dominance, the expected ability represented by
the ﬁrst integral is smaller than the expected ability represented by the second integral.















 1 g(a)(m2 ja)[1 (m2 ja)]da
da.
Using (10), the ﬁrst inequality implies eM[A jm,1]<w = f1. This proves (i).
Part (ii) follows from (11), which says f2 = w2, and from (13), which says
eM[A jm,2]=w2. 
When promotions are within the ﬁrm, one cannot say in general whether males are
promoted at a lower or higher standard than females at the ﬁrst stage, but conditional
on a given standard for females, more males are promoted within the ﬁrm than if pro-
motions were across ﬁrms. Again, this is because the ﬁrm internalizes the information
it generates by keeping males in the pool.
Finally, Proposition 8 also describes the optimal policy when the ﬁrm’s proﬁt de-
pends on the signals produced by the workers rather than on their abilities. For exam-
ple, the value produced in an academic labor market is the quality of the papers writ-




















(z2  w1)g(a)[1 (m1 ja)][1 (m2 ja)](z2 ja)dz2da
But, integrating on z1 and z2, since
R 1
 1z(z j a)dz = a, we have z(f1, f2,m1,m2) =
(f1, f2,m1,m2).
6. Conclusion
Afﬁrmative action policies have been justiﬁed and evaluated from many different per-
spectives,onbothefﬁciencygroundsandequitygrounds. Forthemostpart,economists
have focussed on efﬁciency, especially productive efﬁciency. For example, Holzer and
Neumark (2000, 559) argue from an extensive empirical literature that “afﬁrmativeTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 517
action offers signiﬁcant redistribution toward women and minorities, with relatively
small efﬁciency consequences.” Among the ingenious theoretical arguments for why
afﬁrmative action policies enhance efﬁciency are those of Lundberg and Startz (1983)
and Lundberg (1991), who consider a model of statistical discrimination where wages
depend on imperfect signals of ability. They show, among other things, that the pooling
of workers with different signaling abilities creates more incentive to invest in human
capital. Milgrom and Oster (1987) argue that afﬁrmative action policies can efﬁciently
prevent employers from underpromoting women and minorities. The incentive to un-
derpromote derives from a fear of revealing the worth of their employees to rival ﬁrms,
a threat that is higher for the more “invisible” workers, such as women and minorities.
I have not made efﬁciency central to my analysis, since it is unclear how to deﬁne
it in the context studied here. I have taken the social objectives of gender blindness
or equal promotions as primitive, rather than deriving those objectives from a welfare
function. Thishasallowedmetoilluminateconﬂictsamongthoseobjectivesthatderive
from gender differences in behavior, in particular risk taking. I have simply assumed
that males are hard-wired for risk taking and females are not, and that all agents want to
stay in the hierarchy if allowed.
The efﬁciency criterion that springs to mind for most economists is that marginal
survivors should have the same expected ability. This is the criterion that drives promo-
tion standards when promotions are across ﬁrms, but only because the employers do
not internalize the beneﬁts of collecting information on risk takers, which can possibly
create a better pool for the long run. When promotions are within ﬁrms, the ﬁrm has
an incentive to preserve an option on males at the beginning, since more information
will be collected later. The ﬁrm itself proﬁts from this information. Thus, the promotion
standards are such that the marginal male has lower expected ability than the marginal
female, and in this sense, males are favored. However, the promotion standard itself
may be higher for males than for females in both cases.
There are many other gender differences at work as well. Some of these differences
can be confounding factors that overturn any intrinsic difference in risk taking. In par-
ticular, Becker and Eagly (2004) ﬁnd that females were at least as likely as males to put
themselves at risk in protecting Jews in the Holocaust, and females are considerably
more likely to put themselves at risk by donating kidneys to relatives in need. However,
the authors hypothesize that such behavior might be rooted in a greater willingness of
females to care for others, or to heed an ethical calling. Females may be motivated by
objectives that overcome, and therefore obscure, an aversion to risk.
Further, as I mentioned in the introduction, the noisiness of the signals is not en-
tirely under the control of the employee. Even if males are more risk-taking, they may
be more closely observed within each promotion period than females. The latter hy-
pothesis is consonant with the Milgrom and Oster (1987) “invisibility” hypothesis. If
that effect is strong enough, then females should be understood as the workers who
present noisy signals, and the males should be understood as generating more accurate
signals.518 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
In any case, the main point of the paper is that gender differences in tastes set up a
conﬂict between procedural fairness and disparate impacts. Differences in risk taking
are one example of that larger point.11 A legitimate business purpose is a defense to
disparate impact, but as mentioned in Section 5, a legitimate business purpose cannot
always be distinguished from discriminatory intent.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The same argument applies whether the survival rates are calcu-
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In the third line, where a   ft <0, we haveSF






t (A, f )] > 0, so the integrand is negative. In the
fourth line, where a   ft  0, we have 0 <SM
t (a,m) < 1 =SF
t (a, f ). Since E[SM
t (A,m)] 
E[SF
t (A, f )], we have SM
t (a,m)=E[SM
t (A,m)] < SF
t (a, f )=E[SF
t (A, f )]. Therefore the inte-
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t (A, f )]

g(a)da. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let
¯
m  mt  ¯ m for all t = 1,2,.... Since the distributions G and
 have full support, the probability that any male survives at any date t, conditional on
11In a model where the signal for promotion depends on effort, Bardsley and Sherstyuk (2006) show that
differences in the cost of effort can also lead to different promotion rates.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 519
having survived to t  1, is strictly less than one. That is, 1 (mt ja)<1 for every t and
every a 2R.
(i) Let " >0. Let ˜ a >0 satisfy 0<1 G( ˜ a)<"=2 and let ˜ t satisfy (1 (
¯
m ja))˜ t <"=2
























<G( ˜ a)"=2+(1 G( ˜ a)<".

































t (x,m) da +G(x)
. (15)
Using the boundedness of m and the fact that (md j a) decreases with a due to the










!1 for a >x. (16)
Thus, (15) converges to one as t becomes large. The result follows.
(iii) For given t, write the expected ability of surviving males, EM[A j m,t], in two
parts. The ﬁrst term in (17) is the expected ability of survivors who satisfy jAj>4x, times
theprobabilityofthatevent, andthesecondpartistheexpectedabilityofsurvivorswho
satisfy jAj4x, times the probability of that event:

























































Since Pr[jAj > 4x] + Pr[jAj  4x] = 1, and EM[A j m,t,jAj  4x] >  4x, it is enough
to show that as t becomes large, EM[A j m,t,jAj > 4x] becomes large (larger than 2x)
and Pr[jAj  4x] becomes small (smaller than 1/6). Then EM[A j m,t] > (2x)(5=6)  
(4x)(1=6)=x.





















































Using the boundedness of m and the fact that (md ja) decreases with a due to the




















!1 for a >4x. (20)
Thevalueof(18)islessthan4x, sincethenumeratoraddsanegativetermto4x, and
the denominator of (18) is greater than one. However, using the fact that
R  4x
 1 ag(a)daTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Risk taking and gender in hierarchies 521
is ﬁnite12 and using (19) and (20), it follows that the negative term in the numerator
vanishes for large enough t. Using (20), the second term of the denominator of (18)
vanishes as t becomes large, and we can therefore assert that EM[A jm,t,jAj>4x]>2x
for large enough t.









































(iv) I omit the proof, which is essentially the same as for part (iii), replacing
EM[A jm,t] with eM[A jm,t], and using the fact that  is bounded. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The sequence c =c1,c2,...,ct,... contains at most a ﬁnite number
of values larger than ¯ c +". Let ¯ t be the largest value of t in this set, that is, the latest date
such that ct > ¯ c +". (If the sequence is nondecreasing as in Proposition 5, one can take
" =0 and ¯ t =0.) Because  has full support, there is a positive probability of survival to
time ¯ t, regardless of ability, that is, ¯ SM
¯ t (a,c)>0 for all a.
That ¯ SM
t (a,c) ! 0 for a < ¯ c follows because ¯ Zt converges in probability to a and
a < ¯ c.
That ¯ SM
t (¯ c,c) ! 0 follows from the central limit theorem. When a = ¯ c, the limit
distribution of
p
t( ¯ Zt   ¯ c)=v is normal, centered at 0, where v2 is the variance of . With
positive probability we have
p
t( ¯ Zt   ¯ c)=v <0. But since survival requires that ¯ Zt   ¯ c 0
for all t =1,2,..., the joint probability of survival at t =1,2,... falls to zero.
I now show that for a > ¯ c +", ¯ SM(a,c)>0.
For arbitrary dates t1,t2, it is useful to introduce the notation ¯ Z
t2
t1 for the average of





notation ¯ Zt becomes ¯ Zt
0.
Let P (a,c; ¯ t,Z) be the probability that an agent with ability A = a survives in the
limit, conditional on having survived to ¯ t with average signal ¯ Z
¯ t
0 = Z 2 R. Survival im-
plies thatZ c ¯ t. Given a andZ, write










¯ t ct for all t = ¯ t +1, ¯ t +2,...

, (21)
where f ¯ Zt
¯ t :t = ¯ t +1, ¯ t +2,...g is the random variable.
It is enough to show that P (a,c; ¯ t,Z) > 0 for all a > ¯ c +" and allZ  c ¯ t. Since  has
full support, ¯ SM
¯ t (a,c) > 0 for all abilities a. Therefore if P (a,c; ¯ t,Z) > 0 for all a > ¯ c +"
andZ c ¯ t, we have ¯ SM(a,c)>0 for a > ¯ c +".
12Notice that
R 1
 1a2g(a)da is ﬁnite because variance is ﬁnite.522 Suzanne Scotchmer Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
The ﬁrst line below follows from (21), because c ¯ t > ct, hence, using Z  c ¯ t > ct, we
have Z  ct for all t > ¯ t. Therefore the event [ ¯ Zt
¯ t  ct for all t = ¯ t +1, ¯ t +2,...] implies
the event [(¯ t=t)Z +((t   ¯ t)=t) ¯ Zt
¯ t ct for all t = ¯ t +1, ¯ t +2,...], but not vice versa.
The second line is a change of notation. In the third line, the constant value a is
subtractedfrombothsidesoftheinequality. Thefourthlineusesthefactthatc+¯ t  ¯ c+"
for all >0. The ﬁfth line follows because the distribution of signals is atomless.
P (a,c; ¯ t,Z)>Pr[ ¯ Zt
¯ t ct for all t = ¯ t +1, ¯ t +2,...]
=Pr[ ¯ Z
0 c+¯ t for all =1,2,...]
=Pr[ ¯ Z
0  a c+¯ t  a for all =1,2,...]
Pr[ ¯ Z
0  a  ¯ c +" a for all =1,2,...]
=Pr[ ¯ Z
0  a > ¯ c +" a for all =1,2,...].
For a >c +", choose b1,b2 >0 so that  b1v2  b2 = ¯ c +" a. Then
P (a,c; ¯ t,Z)>Pr[ ¯ Z
0  a > ¯ c +" a for all =1,2,...]
=Pr[ ¯ Z
0  a > b1v2  b2 for all =1,2,...]
Pr[ ¯ Z
0  a > b1v2  b2= for all =1,2,...]
Using Lemma (6) of Dubins and Freedman (1965, p. 801),
Pr[ ¯ Z





P (a,c; ¯ t,Z)>Pr[ ¯ Z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